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ABSTRACT
In this article, we present CORGI, a security-oriented log
visualization tool that allows security experts to visually ex-
plore and link numerous types of log files through relevant
representations and global filtering. The analyst can mark
values as values of interest and then use these values to pur-
sue the exploration in other log files, allowing him to bet-
ter understand events and reconstruct attack scenarios. We
present the user interface and interactions that ensure these
capabilities and provide two use cases based on challenges
from VAST and from the Honeynet project.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: General
– Security and Protection; I.3.6 [Methodologies and Tech-
niques]: Interaction Techniques; H.5.2 [Information In-
terfaces and Presentation]: [User Interfaces]
General Terms
Security, Visualization
Keywords
Visualization, Intrusion Detection, Forensics
1. INTRODUCTION
In the context of IT forensics, analysts rely on log files
that record and describe what happens in various parts of
the system (network segments, routers, servers, hosts, etc.).
Log files exist in different formats and contain different infor-
mation depending on the software that generated them and
what the file describes. While they are invaluable sources
of information, log files are often impractical to analyze
both because of their human-oriented formats and because
of their size (many gigabytes being not uncommon).
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Many visualization tools (among which [8, 16, 25, 23])
have been designed to help analysts better understand the
content of log files. These tools often focus on a specific type
of log file or a specific set of log files. Due to that fact, they
do not allow the analyst to opportunistically benefit from
other types of log files that could be available.
Furthermore, security-oriented visualization tools often aim
to explain global trends or detect events that are symp-
tomatic of a specific attack. It is often considered that
the analysis is a drill down process and that the analyst
is searching for a specific piece of information. However,
even if detecting each malicious action is fundamental, it is
also very important to understand the relations between se-
curity events so as to reconstruct the global scenario [20]:
once the analyst has found an interesting event, he or she
must be able to discover any other related events, even if
these events are stored in different log files generated by dif-
ferent sources therefore exhibiting different formats. What
are, for example, the causal relations between the attacks in
different parts of the system? Having compromised a web
server, did the attackers then perform other malicious ac-
tions on the system? If so, what are the consequences? In
reaction to this, we advocate that IT forensics is an itera-
tive process and that an analyst must be able to easily use
information stored in log files to search for related events in
other log files, even if these are not explicitly related.
In this paper, we present CORGI (Combination, Orga-
nization and Reconstruction using Graphical Interactions),
a web-based visualization tool that allows analysts to im-
port various types of log files and to visualize their contents.
Many log file formats can be exploited, and new ones can
easily be added using a straightforward and consistant de-
scription of log file formats. CORGI also implements an
iterative process inspired by those used for IT forensics by
allowing the analyst to use the values of interest he or she
has found in a given dataset to filter events in other datasets,
thus implicitly relating these datasets.
This paper is organized as follows. First, we explain how
CORGI manages the various log files. Then, we detail how
relations can be efficiently created between log files based
on values of interest. In section 3, we describe the repre-
sentations and user interactions in CORGI. In section 4, we
provide some information about implementation and exper-
imentations. Finally, we discuss related work in section 5.
2. LOG FILES
CORGI uses log files as data sources. In this section, we
first present how log files are organized. We then present
the various operations that can be performed on a dataset
obtained from a log file during an analysis. Finally, we
present how relations can be made between a priori unre-
lated datasets.
2.1 Log File Organization
While exhibiting various contents and formats, log files
are generally organized in a similar way. A log file is made
of a set of entries, each of which corresponds to an event.
These events are made of a set of fields. In CORGI, we
reasonably hypothesize that all the entries in a given log file
contain the same fields, which can of course assume different
values. Since each entry in a given log file corresponds to
an event, we also assume that all the log files used by the
analyst contain a timestamp field which places the event in
time. We should mention that a field can be assigned a
default value if this field is not relevant to the entry. For
instance, the apache standard log format uses the value ’-’
as a default placeholder.
In consequence, most log files can be seen as a table with
as many lines as events and as many columns as fields,
at least one of them being a timestamp. Figure 1 shows
two lines from an apache-access log file extracted from a
dataset made available by the Honeynet Project [2].
10.0.1.2 - - [19/Apr/2010:10:54:12 -0700] \
"GET /feed/ HTTP/1.1" \
200 16605 "-" "Apple-PubSub/65.12.1"
10.0.1.14 - - [19/Apr/2010:11:16:59 -0700] \
"POST /wp-cron.php?doing_wp_cron HTTP/1.0" \
200 - "-" "WordPress/2.9.2; http://www.domain.org"
Figure 1: Two apache standard log entries
This example contains two lines (and therefore two events).
Every event in this log file is described with nine fields, each
with a semantic meaning, in the following order: the IP ad-
dress of the client which made the request to the web server,
the identd of the client machine, the userid of the user if
authenticated, the timestamp defining when the event oc-
cured, the first line of the HTTP request performed by the
client, the HTTP status code returned by the server, the
size of the answer, the client referrer and user agent.
In consequence, a type can be associated with each field.
Types in CORGI are semantic types, in contrast with [14]
for instance: they provide information about the nature and
meaning of the field. Currently we have identified many
semantic types among which: IP Address, TCP Port, UDP
Port, Timestamp, URL, CVE_ID, Size, HTTP Method, HTTP
Status Code, FTP command, userid, City, Country. The
analyst can create further types according to the current
need. Types should be generic enough to be used in as many
log files as possible while being specific enough to avoid am-
biguity. For instance, a Status Code type is too generic
since it could encompass HTTP Status Code and NNTP Sta-
tus Code, which in fact do not have the same meaning.
In addition, a flag is associated with each type stating
whether this type is categorical or not. A categorical type
is a type for which identical values refer to the same mean-
ing while different values refer to different meaning. For
instance, the CVE_ID type is categorical: Two log entries
having the same value for a CVE_ID field refer to the same
vulnerability, while different CVE_ID values refer to differ-
ent vulnerabilities. Similarly, identical values for an IP Ad-
dress refer to the same network device, local addressing and
NAT notwithstanding. In contrast, size and CPU usage for
instance are not categorical: identical values may refer to
different realities while similar events may be logged with
different CPU usage and size values.
CORGI uses semantic types, and more specifically categor-
ical types to create relations between datasets. This aspect
will be described in section 2.3.
2.2 Operations on a Single Log File Contents
When he or she explores a log file for forensics purposes,
an analyst is searching for events of interest, events that are
of particular relevance for understanding and reconstruct-
ing what happened on the monitored system. During ex-
periments we performed with a previous tool [14], we ob-
served that analysts have different approaches for exploring
the same log file. For instance, they do not start by explor-
ing the same fields. These differences can be explained by
the attacks the analysts have been exposed to recently as
well as the information they have been provided with.
While their ways of exploring a given log file are different,
all analysts generally perform sequences of two basic opera-
tions: they choose specific fields to be considered and select
events according to the values exhibited by these fields. In
accordance with the terminology used in relational algebra
[7], we call these operations projections and selections. Pro-
jections consist in choosing fields of interest (for instance,
HTTP Status Code) so as to focus on the information they
contain. Selections consist in choosing specific values for a
given field. For instance, the analyst chooses all the events in
an apache-access log file for which the HTTP Status Code
is equal to 500, 501, 502, 503, 504 or 505 which correspond
to types of server errors.
The exploration of a log file can be described as sequences
of projections and selections which lead to events of interest,
events which are considered particularly interesting for the
analyst. We should mention that the differences between
the different modi operandi of the analysts are linked to the
order in which these operations are performed. However,
if analysts reach the same conclusions, they will have ob-
tained the same set of events of interest whatever order the
projections/selections were in.
When an analyst obtains a set of events of interest, he
or she can consider that the values of some of the fields are
particularly relevant. We call them values of interest. For
instance, it could be the IP Addresses of the hosts which
caused the events of interest to be logged, the CVE_IDes
of the vulnerabilities which were effectively exploited, etc.
Values of interest are obtained by projecting the events of
interest for a specific field of interest and therefore consti-
tute a set of values the events of interest take for this field
of interest associated with the type of the field.
In the next section, we show how values of interest are
used to relate log files.
2.3 Relating Datasets
A given log file offers a local view of events on a specific
part of the monitored system. As such, it allows the de-
tection of malicious actions that were performed in its own
specific context. However, the purpose of forensics is not
only to detect unrelated malicious events but also to recon-
struct the global scenario of the attacks which happened on
the system as a whole. To that end, it is important to be
able to relate the various log files. Since our objective is to
allow the analyst to opportunistically use any log file avail-
able on the system, we also designed CORGI to offer him
or her the ability to dynamically relate log files having no
explicit a priori relation between them. This is done using
both the values of interest and the Timestamp fields.
2.3.1 Relations Based on Values of Interest
Each log entry is made of fields which each have a specific
type. Two log files which exhibit fields of the same type can
be related semantically since they reference objects of the
same nature. For instance, relations can be implied between
log files that both have IP Address, TCP Port, HTTP Status
Code or CVE_ID fields.
Following the idea that forensics is an iterative process
(one discovery leading to another), CORGI relies on values
of interest to relate log files. As stated in the previous sec-
tion, an analyst who discovers events of interest can extract
values of interest from chosen fields. Because these values
are typed, it is possible to use them for filtering log files
with at least one field of the same type, i.e., to select this
field and only keep entries for with values listed in the pro-
vided values of interest. As a result, the new selection only
contains events with values previously defined as being of
interest in the first log file.
We should mention that if a log file has more than one
field of a given type, the analyst can apply the filter to any
number of them. For instance, IP Addresses of interest ob-
tained from an apache log can be used to select the source IP
Address field of a snort log file, its destination IP Address
or both. Relations can also be performed on the same log
file. For instance, if some IP Addresses are indentified as
victims (Destination IP Address) in a Snort log, it can be
interesting to use these as filters on the Source IP Address
of the same Snort log to discover compromised machines
being used as stepping stones to launch attacks.
As explained, log files are related a posteriori in CORGI.
Only elements considered of interest in one log file can be
related to other log files by using them as filters. With
this approach, we avoid combinatorial explosions which can
occur when using natural joins1 between log files. While en-
forcing type constraints prevents the analyst from making
mistakes by relating semantically different data, the pro-
posed mechanism also allows more freedom regarding the
possible relations that can be explored. We strongly believe
that the analyst should have the last word for when it makes
sense to relate two log files since he or she is better informed
on analysis context.
2.3.2 Relations Based on Time
Time is critical information when reconstructing attack
scenarios. In point of fact, events belonging to the same
attack scenario are linked by their time of occurrence. The
knowledge that two events are simultaneous or that one hap-
pened after the other is particularly relevant for an analyst.
1We use the term natural join in the relational algebra sense,
i.e., each entry in a log file is associated with every entry in
the other if they have the same value for the selected fields.
In log files, time is stored by the Timestamp field. In con-
trast with the data types we presented in the previous sec-
tion, the Timestamp type is not categorical. Due to clock
drifting in the machines and the time it takes to generate
a log entry, two events stored in different log files and cor-
responding to the same observed event may not exhibit the
same Timestamp, and two unrelated events may share the
same Timestamp. Modifying Timestamp precision to com-
pensate for this fact is dangerous. First, it is very difficult
to arbitrarily estimate clock skews and imprecisions. Sec-
ond, in busy systems, the produced datasets may be big.
Finally, events which are part of an attack scenario may be
spread over long periods. Such is the case with Advanced
Persistant Threats for example.
For these reasons, CORGI uses visual correlation to help
the analyst relate log files in time. As will be shown in more
details in Section 3, CORGI offers a synthetic representation
in which the various log files are presented on a shared time
scale to enable a direct visual correlation allowing analysts
to perceive simultaneity and possible causality.
In the next section, we present how these concepts are
implemented in CORGI in terms of representations and user
interactions.
3. VISUALIZATION AND USER INTERAC-
TION
In this section, we describe the interface and the user inter-
actions we designed to help explore logs using visualization
tools. We first provide an overview of the interface, then
some details about its different areas and how the analyst
interacts with them.
3.1 Overview
The main interface in CORGI (see Fig. 2) is divided into 4
panels, each of which has a specific purpose linked to a step
in the exploration process. We will describe these panels in a
counter-clockwise fashion, following our general interaction
procedure.
In the top left corner, the header panel houses the log im-
port button. The analyst can either click this button to select
log files for importing or drag and drop these files from a file
explorer. When new log files are imported, they are parsed
and appear in the leftmost timeview panel which displays
the event time distribution for each log file. When log files
are selected in the timeview panel, their fields appear in the
adjacent fields summary view, which displays field distribu-
tions using sparkline type bar charts. When more than one
dataset is selected in the timeview panel, the fields of every
selected dataset are displayed. The full-sized chart view is
the main panel. It contains all the full-sized charts with axes
and labels. Finally, the values of interest box located in the
header panel is designed both to collect the values of interest
discovered during the analysis and to apply these values of
interest as filters for other fields of the same type.
An analysis follows the same path as our tour of the inter-
face: After the log files have been imported for exploration,
the analyst is first given an overview of these to compare
the event time distribution. He or she can then obtain more
information about the value distribution for each field and
compare these across log files. If some fields look particu-
larly interesting, he or she may then explore them further
Figure 2: An overview of CORGI.
and select specific values. When values of interest have been
found, the analyst can store them and a new exploration cy-
cle begins: these values of interest can be used to filter fields
with the same type or new log files can be imported analysis.
This design prevents the analyst from being lost during the
exploration process and also removes any constraint on the
order in which the log files and fields are explored.
CORGI’s interface also follows one following key unifying
rule: each log file is assigned a color which is applied to its
visualizations in the entire interface to help distinguish be-
tween files. This helps analysts identify the source of fields,
from which log files values of interest where collected and on
which field(s) they have been applied.
We now provide more details about each of these compo-
nents in the following sections.
3.2 Importing Logs
CORGI uses a slightly modified version of the importation
mechanism designed for [14]. A variety of log formats are
available, among which apache standard, syslog and its
variations, Snort alert logs and the 2012 VAST Challenge
firewall log [26]. Adding new log file formats is straight-
forward: each log file type is handled by a specific parser
which provides a regular expression matching valid log en-
tries for this format, as well as the name and type for each
field. In consequence, if new types of log file need to be
imported, this requires nothing more than the right regular
expression, with the names and semantic type for each field,
as well as an indication of whether or not the field is cate-
gorical. The need for a semantic type for each field and an
indication of whether they are categorical or not is the only
difference with the ELVis log acquisition mechanism.
When importing a set of log files, the first entry of each
of them is tested by each available parser until a match is
found, in which case each entry is parsed and normalized2,
each field is mapped to its descriptors, the events are counted
and the log time period is retrieved.
For each imported log file, a new representation is created
in the timeview panel.
3.3 Timeview Panel
The timeview panel displays the distribution of events ac-
cross time for the imported log files. It is composed of two
similar representations which both visualize the datasets us-
ing stacked charts sharing a scale to enable correlation by
time.
The first representations cover a globally encompassing
time scale and use a reduced size horizon chart [12]. The
dates are displayed in a human-friendly format, which first
provides the analyst with the knowledge of the period over
which the events have been logged in each log file. In Fig.
2 for instance, the auth.log file spans the full period while
the www-access.log and www-media.log files contain events
within a shorted period. In this precise case, this is due
to the fact that roll-overs are different for syslog files and
apache log files. However, the absence of events over a
given period could also mean that the intruder shut the log-
2While IP addresses often look the same, timestamps for
instance exhibit very different formats, e.g., some of them
do not contain the year.
ging system down temporarily, or that parts of the log file
have been erased. The horizon-chart based representation
allows the analyst to notice these patterns immediately.
This representation also provides an overview of the event
distribution over time in a way similar to [9]. As such,
macro-events such as DDoS or brute-force attacks for exam-
ple are detected immediately. Because the representations
of the log files are aligned, visual correlation is much eas-
ier: synchronized attacks over multiple systems, appearing
in multiple log files, exhibit vertical alignment patterns while
causally-related events exhibit delayed activity patterns.
While this representation provides the analyst with an in-
teresting overview of the events, he or she can also zoom
in to obtain more details about a specific period. A unified
brush on the horizon charts allows for filtering the time pe-
riod and controls the time scale for the second set of area
charts underneath and enables the detailed inspection of our
global timeline. This part provides complementary informa-
tion about each log file: its name, the number of events
contained within the selected time period, and a vertical
axis for better evaluating the quantity of log entries for each
period. The horizontal axis located at the top provides a
more detailed timeframe for the selected period.
When the analyst clicks on the representation of a log file,
its fields are displayed in the fields summary view, which
we present in the next section. A second click removes the
fields from the field summary view to avoid overwhelming
the analyst.
3.4 Fields Summary View
The field summary view contains a summary chart repre-
sentation of all the fields selected in the timeview panel. In
order to help the analyst, each field exhibits the same color
as the log file it belongs to.
The field summary view first informs the analyst about
the available fields in a given log file. The name of each field
is provided as well as the number of distinct values this field
exhibits. Finally, the bar chart displays the distribution of
the values for this field. By taking up little space on the
screen, it allows the analyst to easily notice and compare
unusual distributions.
Each chart reacts to the current time filter applied in
the timeview panel and updates accordingly. An analyst
can therefore inspect the evolution of the distributions for
a given field by brushing and sliding the selection in the
timeview panel.
This feature is very effective for detecting massive events
happening on a very short period such as brute-force at-
tacks, DDoS, etc. In this kind of situation, the distributions
of the values in some of the fields change noticibly in a very
short period. For instance, in the case of a brute force at-
tack against the admin password on a web service, a single
or a few IP addresses will perform a noticeable share of the
requests for a very short time and will therefore be over-
represented, but only for a few minutes. Depending on the
size of the analyzed log file and any eventual sampling, the
share of these requests could stay undetected. In contrast,
when the analyst brushes the timeview panel, he or she can
observe modifications at certain times in the IP address dis-
tributions which require further investigations.
To obtain more information about some fields, the analyst
can click on summary representations to trigger the display
of full-sized charts.
3.5 Full-Sized Charts View
The full-sized charts view contains the complete represen-
tations of the fields the analyst selected for exploration in
the field summary view. A full-sized chart (see Fig. 3) ex-
hibits the same color as the log files it comes from. The
values the field takes and the number of events with this
values are provided.
Figure 3: The full-sized chart of an HTTP Status
code field.
Representations are automatically selected according to
the field chosen by the analyst and using the same approach
presented in [14]. For instance, Fig. 3 corresponds to the
selection of a single HTTP Status Code which is categorical
while Fig. 4 shows the representation produced for the se-
lection of an HTTP Status Code and IP field, both being
categorical in nature.
Figure 4: The full-sized chart of HTTP Status Code
and IP fields.
We should mention that CORGI only combines fields com-
ing from the same log file into a single representation. In-
deed, it would make no sense to combine different fields com-
ing from different log files since their values cannot be safely
related to shared single event.
Analysts can perform selections on the values of full-sized
charts by clicking on them. The result of this selection is
then applied to all the representations dealing with the same
log file. For example, if the analyst selects the values 500
and 502 in the HTTP Status Code representation, all the
representations for the same log file are modified to only
display the events for which the HTTP Status Code is equal
either to 500 or to 502. For instance, the IP chart only
displays IP addresses linked to requests which generated 500
or 502 HTTP Status Code.
Additional information and interactions are proposed on
the upper right of each full-sized representation. First, the
names of the represented fields are displayed. Three small
buttons are available:
• The cross button removes the representation. The
selections that were made using it are dismissed.
• The flag button collects values of interest.
• The check button keeps this representation as is. If
other fields that belong to the same log file are selected
afterward in the same log file, they will not be added
to this representation. It is however still possible to
perform selections on it.
When values of interest have been found in a chart, the an-
alyst can click the flag button to collect these. For example,
if the analyst selected 500 and 502 values in the HTTP Sta-
tus Code and wants to keep the IP addresses which caused
these values to be logged, he or she can click on the flag
button of the IP field representation. It is of course possible
to generate values of interest for more than one field of the
same log file.
In the next section, we show how values of interest are
represented and how the analyst interacts with them.
3.6 Values of Interest Box
The values of interest box is located in the upper panel.
It contains the values of interest which have been collected
by the analyst. A given value of interest is represented as
follows, left to right:
• The name of the field from which the values of interest
were extracted, color coded for the log file it came
from.
• the semantic type of that field.
• the values of interest, which can be individually tog-
gled.
• the names of the fields the values of interest can be
applied to as filters, color coded for the datasets they
belong to.
Here, Fig. 5 shows a set of two values of interest obtained
from the IP field in the blue dataset (in this case, an apache
access log file), with the IP semantic type. It contains two
values (208.80.69.69 and 65.88.2.5) and can be applied to
the field named IP in the green log file. This last box is filled,
which indicates that the filter is currently applied, but only
for the currently selected address, which is 208.80.69.69.
Figure 5: Two IP addresses selected as values of
interest.
In order to remember from where these values of interest
originate, the analyst can hover over the value of interest. A
tool tip then displays the selections that led to obtain these
values (in this case, HTTP Status Code = 500 or 502).
Because the values of interest box is located in the upper
panel, it allows the analyst to keep an eye on these values
at all times. This helps to guide the selections that can be
performed based on the values in the various fields of the
displayed log files.
After this presentation of the interface and interactions
used by CORGI, we provide details on their implementation
and cases studies in the next section.
4. IMPLEMENTATION AND CASE STUDY
CORGI is implemented as a web tool using HTML5, Java-
script, CSS and SVG. It uses React [3] to manage the user
interface and is built upon the Flux application architecture
[4]. These projects follow the fundamental premise that a
unidirectional flow of data is central to the application. Us-
ing this foundation helped us build CORGI around data
pipeline models [10, 27]. Although the SVG markup for our
visualizations is generated using React, the d3.js library [6]
is used to directly generate axes and paths as well as man-
aging layouts and scales. Fast filtering is implemented using
the Crossfilter library [1] which provides an OLAP server for
interfacing with datasets as n-dimensional data cubes. As it
inherits its log parsing and chart selection capabilities from
ELVis [14], CORGI can both parse multiple log formats and
select charts automatically with minimal effort.
We used CORGI to explore the 2012 HoneyNet Visual-
ization Challenge [2] and the 2012 VAST Challenge [26]
datasets on a MacBook Pro with 4GB of memory, a 2.5GHz
Intel Core i5 processor and a GeForce GT 330M graphics
card with 512MB of memory. We used Google Chrome ver-
sion 36.
The 2012 Honeynet Visualization challenge dataset con-
tains log files that were gathered on a real compromised ma-
chine. In this dataset, there are about 10 different log files:
auth.log, dpkg.log, kern.log, www-access.log, www-error.log,
etc. For this case study, we will inspect the www-access.log
and www-media.log files, which are logs from an apache web
server, and the auth.log file, which is the authentication log
for the host. The www-access.log and www-media.log files
are consistent with the description given in Subsection 2.1.
The latter logs the requests related to media such as im-
ages, CSS and Javascript files, while the first one logs the
main requests. The auth.log file contains different fields:
timestamp, host, application, process id and the authenti-
cation message from which we can often extract an action,
a user name and an IP address when the authentication is
remote. Once the files are imported into CORGI, we first no-
tice inconsistencies between the www-media.log and www-
access.log files. There is a burst of requests in the www-
access.log file at a specific time while there are only a few
requests at the same time in the www-media.log file. There
are also two bursts in the auth.log files, the latter seemingly
synchronized with one in the www-access.log file.
We first address the www-access.log file activity by in-
specting the HTTP status codes, especially the server errors
(5xx codes). We notice that only two IP addresses are re-
sponsible for these errors (65.88.2.5 and 208.80.69.69), and
mark these IP addresses accordingly, as values of interest.
We then decide to track them in the three files using the
values of interest box. In the www-access.log file, there are
many other requests that do not seem harmful. Both the IP
adresses are present in the www-media.log file. The second
one generates several client errors by requesting a javascript
URL not present on the server. By tracking these values of
interest in the auth.log dataset, we notice that there were
eight SSH authentication successes and one failure from both
these IP addresses. For the second one, there are logged
warnings of failed reverse DNS mappings. Two user names
were used in these SSH connections: user1 and user3. These
kinds of user names seem strange on a host, although they
could very well be due to the anonymization process. We
collect these as values of interest to continue the exploration
of the logs. Using CORGI, we were able to easily track ac-
tivity for both these IP addresses accross all three log files.
For our second case study, we inspected log files from the
2012 VAST Challenge. The second mini-challenge provides
us with four log files. According to the described scenario,
these logs come from the computer networks of a regional
bank. Two files are 24-hour logs from a Snort IDS, while
the others are firewall logs covering the same period. Due
to space contraints, we cannot describe the full analysis of
the VAST challenge and we will focus on part of our analysis
of the IDS log covering the first 24 hours.
Thanks to the possibility of selecting and excluding val-
ues, we discovered that 9 external IP addresses were the
source of IRC traffic directed towards 314 different destina-
tion IP addresses in the internal network, and marked these
9 IP addresses as values of interest accordingly, refered to
as A from now on. We also discovered 5 IP addresses in
the internal network which are sources of scans of different
services on the firewall. Again, we marked these 5 IP ad-
dresses as values of interest, refered to as B from now on.
Our last discovery is more concerning: client hosts in the
internal network scanned the firewall of the bank. We pur-
sue our exploration by applying the IP addresses in B as a
filter for the source IP address field. This allows us to know
whether they are the source of other alerts. As this is not
the case, we then apply these values as a filter for the desti-
nation IP addresses. This allows us to know whether these
IP addresses were the target of attacks. This time we find
that this is the case for 4 of the 5 IP addresses in B: they are
implicated in the IRC traffic with the 9 source IP addresses
in A. We hypothesize that the hosts in B may be part of a
botnet controlled via IRC by the hosts in A.
In this use case, we show how the ability to select and
exclude different field values, mark some as values of interest
and use these values to filter the same dataset can quickly
and easily provide clues about what happened in log files.
5. RELATED WORKS
CORGI is based partly on concepts already used in ELVis,
such as generating visualizations based on selected typed
fields. This automatic selection is based on principles close
to those used in Autovis [28]. We use the nature of the
content, statistical analysis of the data aspects and rules
from the Grammar of Graphics [27] to select and generate
visualizations. ELVis was designed using the same principles
but was optimized for security data. CORGI takes this logic
and security tuned design further. For example, we assume
that network events can all be correlated and compared in
time and have designed a chart to better exploit that.
For effective visual exploration of logs we consider certain
functions essential such as filtering, annotation and support
for multiple datasets. As explained previously, the interface
in CORGI relies heavily on reactive filtering and synchro-
nization for elements of the interface. PortVis [21] displays
multiple synchronized time charts to allow for both global
and detailed visualization, and Muelder et al. use a global
view synchronized with a detailed view [22]. The time view
in CORGI uses the same approach with two linked time
charts, one global and one filtered, in an effort to help to
provide both context and detail in one component simulta-
neously for multiple datasets.
To provide exploration using a drill-down approach, we
rely on synchronized update and filtering in charts. NVi-
sionIP [17] follows a similar approach using multiple charts
to provide this drill-down interaction cycle as does Clock-
View [15] on a larger scale using four synchronized visu-
alizations designed for successive and progressive filtering.
Harrison et al. designed a tool [11] in which each visualiza-
tion is designed to provide access to the different features of
networks: spatial disposition using graphs, time histograms
for network events and a scatterplot visualization for spec-
tral data analysis. Tools linked to real world forensics such
as the Analysts Notebook [5] also use combinations: maps
for localizing forensic data and graphs to then visualize links
in this data. We follow the same approach without a prede-
fined set of visualizations, instead letting the operator decide
to create visualizations best suited for that point of the ex-
ploration.
Increasing its similarity to CORGI, improvements to NVi-
sionIP add the capacity for recording and reusing effective
search patterns [18] based on features often found in certain
anomalies. Further improvements also add sparkline charts
[29] for increased data density.
Aiming to improve the reactivity and available options for
corporate security operators, Hertzog [13] proposes building
visualisations by first reducing the data to those members
deemed most important, and then to group these events by
meta-application, e.g. web applications. We reason that by
comparing and relating datasets using their fields and values,
we implicitely group data by importance and feature.
The two tools that seem closest to this project are Polaris
[24] and FlowTag [19]. Polaris takes a similar approach to
statistical typing, choosing to identify fields as either ordi-
nal or quantitative, and then using these to assist the user
in creating visualizations. These are produced by combin-
ing the fields of multiple sources of data into different lay-
ers of visualization. Filtering is made possible using a data
cube which directly maps a database schema. The authors
then describe the direct link between this progressive filter-
ing and the progressive creation of relational queries to a
database, and hypothesize that the tuples selected graphi-
cally and used for queries can themselves be exported as a
further dataset. FlowTag adopts a less direct approach to
extracting relevant information, and uses filtering to exclude
irrelevant dataflows combined with tagging to identify and
characterize relevant flows. This approach aims to improve
the quality of reports and automatic report generation.
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have presented CORGI, a web based tool for the si-
multaneous exploration and semantic relating of multiple log
files. CORGI is built upon the assistive visualization capa-
bilites of ELVis, implements synchronized views, fast data
cube type filtering and guided exploration using points of
interest. These values of interest can then be used to filter
and link multiple logs.
We have many plans for extending this system. The cur-
rent state of the tool relies on local files and the processing
capabilities of browsers. Extending this model to a server
backend for log collection and aggregation would let us ex-
plore larger files spanning multiple systems using more com-
plex data operations, including real time updates. We are
already experimenting with UI state serialization, and us-
ing a server backend would also open-up new possibilites for
collaboration and sharing forensic analysis sessions.
Once values of interest are collected and verified they can
be stored and exported as new datasets. In the long term
one of our goals is to use these to help generate reports and
improve future exploration assistance. As this information
can be imported and then directly reused in CORGI these
reports could themselves be analysed and related, essentially
starting a new interactive session and using the same advan-
tages provided during the initial exploration.
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